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A QUIET FAITH? TAXES, POLITICS, AND
THE PRIVATIZATION OF REI GION
RICHARD W. GARNETT*
Abstract- The government exempts religious associations fi'om taxation
and, in return, restricts their putatively political expression and
activities. This exemption-and-restriction scheme imites government to
interpret and categorize the means by which religious communities live
out their vocations and engage the world. But government is neither
well-suited nor to be trusted with this kind of line-drawing. What's more,
this invitation is dangerous to authentically religious consciousness and
associations. When government communicates and enforces its oun
view of the nature of religion-i.e., that it is a private matter-and of its
proper place-i.e., in the private sphere, not in politics-it tempts both
believers and faith communities to embrace this view. The result is a
privatized faith, re-shaped to suit the vision and needs of government,
and a public square evacuated of religious associations capable of
mediating between persons and the state and challenging prophetically
the government's claims and conduct.
Tlwse who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not knout
what religion means.1
Religion is not the church a man goes to, but the cosmos he lives in.2
INTRODUCTION
Everyone remembers Chief Justice Marshall's observation in
McCulloch v. Mayland that the "power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy."3 And though it is tempting to join Justice Frankfurter in dis-
* Assistant Professor, Notre Dame Law School. The author thanks Anthony Bellia,
Patricia Bellia, Nicole Stelle Garnett, DeanJohn Garvey, Marci Hamilton, SteffenJohnson,
Tom Shaffer, and Steven Smith for their comments and suggestions; Fred Marczyk and
Diane Meyers for their usual helpful research assistance; and the staff of the BosToN CoL-
LEGE Lw REviEw-particularly Michael Marcucci, Christopher Morrison, Angela Cmnp-
bell, Michael Dube, andJohn Gordon-for their hard work and patience.
1 MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, THE WORDS OF GANDHI 76 (Richard Attenborough ed. 1982)
(quoted in Daniel J. Morrissey, The Separation of Churdi and State. An American-Catholic Per-
spective, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1997)).
2 G. K. CHESTERTON, IRISH IMPR.SSIONS 215 (1919).
3 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819); see also Murdock % Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
112 (1943) ('The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or sup-
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missing this pithy catch-phrase as a "seductive clich&" or "flourish of
rhetoric,"4 Marshall did have a point. The imposition of a tax is, after
all, an assertion of power and an "application of force."5 The same is
true of the decision not to tax, or to exempt from taxation. A power is
no less real that is exercised selectively or indulged with restraint. The
decision to exempt certain associations, persons, activities, or things
from taxation presupposes and communicates the ability to do other-
wise; definitional lines drawn to mark the boundaries of such exemp-
tions implicitly assert the power to draw them differently.
Like other tax-exempt charitable organizations, religious associa-
tions may not, among other things, "participate in, or intervene in...
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi-
date for public office," nor may they devote a "substantial part of
[their] activities [to] carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempt-
ing to influence legislation."6 My claim here is that the decision to ex-
empt religious associations from federal taxation may reasonably be
regarded as an assertion of power-the power, perhaps, to "destroy"-
over these communities, their activities, and their expression.7
press its enjoyment."). Cf Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Hlolnes,
J., dissenting) ("[T]iis Court ... can defeat the attempt to discriminate or otherwise go
too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this Court sits.").
4 Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939) (Frankfurtei-J., concur-
ring) (observing that "the intellectual fashion of the times indulged a free use of abso-
lutes").
5 Stephen L. Carter, The Free Exercise Thereof 38 WAn. & MARY L. REv. 1627, 1639 (1997)
("It is the application of force, not the happenstance that one is able to apply it with Il-
gitimate authority, that generates the power that destroys the specialness of religion.").
6 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) (1986). It should be noted that section 501 (c) (3) is only the
tip of a monstrous iceberg of tax law that affects churches. It is also one of several provi-
sions that regulates their assertedly political activities. See Deirdre Dessingue H Jalloran &
Kevin M. Kearney, Federal Tax Code Restrictions on Church PoliticalAcliviy, 38 Cxrit. LAw. 105,
106 & n. 3 (1998).
The history of the restrictions contained in this provision is fascinating. It appears they
were adopted after ahost no discussion in Congress, to advance no stated public ptrpose
or policy, other than the silencing of then-Senator Lyndon B.Johnson's political enemnies,
See generally, e.g., Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax
Law Control onPolitical Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 217, 228 (1992); Randy Lee,
Wen a King Speaks of God; IWen God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax-Exempt Status, and the
Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391, 392 (2001); Pat-
rick O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohib-
tion on Campaigningfor Churches, 42 B.C. L. REv. 733 (2001).
7 SeeJohn Witte,Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitu-
tional Practice? , 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 363, 414-15 (1991) ("To give the state the power to tax
the church would for many be tantamount to giving it the power to destroy the church.").
Cf. Rex W. Huppke, Church leaders See Sezure as First Domino, Tnm SOUTi BEND Tim., Dec.
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Strictly speaking, though, this Article is not about the churches'
conditional tax exemption, or about its history, interpretation, or ap-
plication.8 I take it that the First Amendment permits government to
exempt churches from taxation,9 and I am sympathetic to tie doc-
trinal arguments that the accompanying restrictions on churches' ex-
pression burden First Amendment freedoms. 10
Instead, this Article is a reflection on just a few of the implica-
tions of the government's claim to the power and competence to draw
and police a line between religious and political expression, activities,
and "spheres."1 Both the claim itself, and the messages it sends, raise
17, 2000, at D1O (describing 16 year tax dispute between the United States and the Indian-
apolis Baptist Temple and the resulting seizure of the Temple's building, and quoting its
minister as saying, "[t]he church cannot be destroyed").
8 This is an intimidating area, and I have learned a great deal from, for example, Eric
J. Ablin, The Pice of Not Rendering to Caesar. Restrictions on Churrh Participation in Political
Camnpaigns, 13 NoTRE DAmE J. L. ETHics & Pun. PoL'Y 541, 541 (1999); Anne Berrill
Carroll, supra note 6; Edw¢ard McGlynn Gaff neyJr., On ot Rendering to Caesar The Unconsti-
tutionali, of Tax Re, tlation ofActivities of Reigious Organizations Relating to Polities, 40 DEPAuL
L. REv 1, 1 (1990); Halloran & Kearney, supra note 6; and Lee, supra note 6; and Glenn
Goodwin, Note, Would Caesar Tax God? The Constitutionality of Gowernmental Taxation of
Churdes, 35 Dn. Jx L. REv. 383,383 (1985/1986).
9 See, eg., Walz v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 664 (1970); Robert E. Rodes,jr., The Lnast Days
of Erastianisn: Forms in the American Chl.nri-State NMeus, 62 I-ARv. TMEO. Rxv. 301, 317
(1969) ("Churches have been wholly or partially exempt fiom secular taxes since the time
of Constantine at least; only the most rigorous ideologues feel that such exemption violates
state or federal constitutional provisions."). Some argue that the First A nendment, rightly
understood, requires the tax exemption. See, e.g., Goodwin, sipra note 8, at 384 (arguing
that "exemption of churches from taxation is not merely constitutionall-lpermissible, it is
constitutionall)-required"). Cf. Everson v Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (The people
[in Virginia], as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could
be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or
otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious indi-
vidual or group.").
10 For more on these arguments, and the related claim that the prohibition on puta-
tively political activities by churches burdens is an unconstitutional condition on their tax-
exempt status, see, for example Carroll, supra note 6, at 254-56; Ga-Tney sipra note 8, at
35-39. See genera/!y Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pitpits: A First Amendment A na sis of
MRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. Rev 875 (2001).
But see, e.g., Jimmy Su-aggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 380 (1990)
(holding that California did not violate the First Amendment by imposing sales and use
tax liability on the sale of "religious materials" by religious organization); Branch Minis-
tries v. Rossotti, 211 E3d 137, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that church whose tax-
exempt status had been revoked failed to demonstrate that its "free exercise rights ha[d]
been substantially burdened").
11 See Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. %, Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (noting that the
'transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to
the private sphere") (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)); see also Lemon v
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ('The objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the
intrusion of either into the precincts of the other.").
July 2001]
Boston College Law Review[
provocative questions about the nature of religious faith and vocation,
the meaning of religious freedom, the ideological ambitions of the
contemporary liberal state, and the roles played in civil society by re-
ligious and other associations that mediate between persons and gov-
ernment. 12
After borrowing from the headlines to provide real-world context
for the discussion, I turn to the invitation extended to government in
the exemption-and-restriction scheme to interpret and categorize the
expression and activities of religious associations. This invitation is
considered in light of current events and recent judicial decisions,
including the Supreme Court's ruling in Good News Club v. Milford Cen-
tral SchooL'3 This consideration yields no dramatic constitutional ar-
guments or sweeping policy proposals. Instead, my goal is merely to
encourage an appropriate wariness about government efforts either
to determine or assign the "real" meaning of what religious believers
and communities say and do.14
Next, I will suggest that the churches' conditional exemption,
and the government theologizing it seems to invite, might, in Profes-
sor Bradley's words, "most profitably [be] understood as [govern-
ment] attempts to move religion into the realm of subjective prefer-
ence by eliminating religious consciousness."1-5 In other words, maybe
the power to tax churches, to exempt them from taxation, and to at-
tach conditions to such exemptions really does, as Chief Justice Mar-
shall quipped, "involve[] the power to destroy" religion. Neither
heavy-handed repression nor even overt hostility toward faith is re-
quired, but merely the subtly didactic power of the law. Government
need only express and enforce its own view of the nature of religion-
i.e., that it is a private matter-and of its proper place-i.e., in the
private sphere, not in politics-and religious believers and associa-
12 See generally Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Ex-
pression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. Rv. 1841, 1849-56 (2001) (discussing role of religious
and other mediating institutions in forming persons and shaping values).
13 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
14 For a fascinating discussion of a similar problem in a different context, see Ttan N.
Samnahon, Note, The Religion Clauses and Political Asyhtan: Religious Persecution Clains and the
Religious lembership-Conversion hnposter Problem, 88 GEO. L.J. 2211 (2000) (discussing time
United States's efforts to detect fraudulent conversions by persons seeking asylum).
15 Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmnatomachy: A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clattse Cases,
30 ST. Louis U.LJ. 275, 277 (1986).
[Vol. 42:771
Taxs, Politics, and the Pivatization of Religion
tions may yield to the temptation to embr ace, and to incorporate, this
view themselves.' 6
Finally, and in keeping with the revivd of interest in the structure
and function of "civil society,"17 I offer some brief, general thoughts
on the mediating role of religious associations and on how the privati-
zation of faith might undermine that role. I will suggest that restric-
tions on churches' "political" activities and expression not only un-
dermine "religious consciousness" but also threaten to denude the
terrain of public life. There is the danger that, having made their own
the government's view of religion's place, now-humbled and no-
longer-prophetic religious associations will retreat with their witness to
the "private" sphere where-they now agree-they belong, leaving
persons to face the state alone in the hollowed-out remains of the
public square.' 8
Now, I should make clear at the outset that none of this is to deny
that government officials distinguish between faith and politics, and
between religious and other forms of expression, all the thne. Indeed,
the Constitution itself sometimes requires precisely this kind of care-
ful line drawing.19 After all, the government may preach recycling,
exercise, and tolerance, but it may not preach infa-nt baptism or the
Immaculate Conception; it may demand testimony in a court of law;
but it may not demand recitation of the Apostle's Creed; it wisely en-
dorses and celebrates the achievements of the Duke and Notre Dmune
16 SeeBradley, supra note 15, at 276-77 ("The Court is now clearly committed to articu-
lating and enforcing a normative scheme of 'private' religion."). But see Richard S. Myers,
The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Rdigion, 41 CATH. U. L RE%. 19, 22 (1991) (argu-
ing that "Bradley's argument overstates the success of the priatization thesis in
influencing Frst Amendment doctrine").
17 See generally, e.g., Symposium, Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Rive
Civil Sociey 75 CI.-Karr L. REV. 289 (2000) [hereinafter Symposiun].
18 And, as Thomas More put it in The Mlan for All Seasons, "[do we] really think [we]
could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?" ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL
SEASONs 66 (Vintage Int'l 1990) (1960).
19 Cf., Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2111 n.3 (Scalia,J., concurring) ("We have drawn a ...
distinction ... between religious speech generally and speech about religion-but only
witi regard to restrictions the State must place on its own speech, where pervasive state
monitoring is unproblematic."). Relatedly, courts considering free-eercise claims are re-
quired, as a matter of course, to determine the sincerity, though of course not the merits,
of claimants' religious beliefs. See, eg., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ('The determination of what is a religious belief or practice is
more often than not a difficult and delicate task. ... However, the resolution of that ques-
tion is not to turn upon ajudicial perception of the particular belief or practice in ques-
tion; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.").
July 2001]
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basketball teams, 20 but may not endorse the religious mission and vo-
cation of the Society of Jesus. Still, it strikes me that the Internal
Revenue Code section 501 (c) (3)'s exemption-and-restriction scheme
is noteworthy in the extent to which it invites government to label as
"propaganda" or "campaign [ing]" what are, for religious believers
and communities, expressions of their faith and responses to their
calling.21 It is far from clear that this is an appropriate task for the lib-
eral state.22
Nor is the claim that religious expression and activity are outside
the scope of legitimate government concern. To question the gov-
ernment's ability to determine the theological significance of an activ-
ity is not to deny its power reasonably to regulate that activity. My con-
cern, instead, is that the premises of the conditional exemption
scheme, the labeling it invites, and the monitoring of the distinctions
it creates will tame religion by saying what it is and identifying what it
is not, tempt religion to revise its conception of itself and of its mis-
20 Se4 e.g., Bush Salttes NCAA Champions, A.P. Online, Apr. 2S, 2001, available at 2001
WIL 18930977 ("President Bush saluted NCAA basketball champs front Duke and Notre
Dame at the White House Monday.").
21 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3) (1986). It could be objected here that for government to label
as "political" (or as "propaganda" or "campaigning") a religious ( onununities' expression
or activity is not, in fact, to say that such expression or activity is not or no longer religious.
In other words, tie conditional-exemption scheme does not invite government to distih-
guish religious from political speech, or the religious from the political sphere; it simply
requires government, for its own limited purposes, and not as the truth of the matter, to
identify certain conduct or expression as-whatever else it may be--also "political." This is
an important point-one that could reasonably be raised at many points in this Article--
and I thank my colleagues Patricia Bellia and Nicole Stelle Garnett for raising it.
In response, it strikes me that while it is true that the government labeling required by
the exemption scheme could be treated not as an "either/or," "religious or political?" but
as more of a "but also" determination, it is in fact regarded, by government, churches, anti
the public, as the latter. See, e.g., Press Release, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 'hiladel-
phia Should Drop Plan to Produce Voter Guides, Says Americans United (Mar. 31, 1999),
available at http://wiv.au.org/press/pr331922.htmn (last visited May 14, 2001) (quoting
Rev. Barry Lynn's statement that "[cihurches must stay out of partisan politics" because "it
runs counter to die mission of America's faith communities"). I would also respond by
insisting that even a "but also" determination by government sends the message, and en-
dorses the view, that religious faith is a private matter, for the private sphere, antI ought
not (for any number of reasons) insert itself into politics. As I discuss in more detail below,
I am troubled by the implications and effects of this message.
22 Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mein. Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (noting that die Constitution "forbids civil courts from playing ... a
role" in "tie interpretation of particular church doctrines"); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I would dismiss the indictment and have
done with this business ofjudicially examining other people's faiths.").
[Vol. 42:771
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sion, and convince religious consciousness to internalize the state's
own judgment that faith simply does not belong in politics.
Nearly 30 years ago, an eminent minister insisted before Con-
gress that:
[T]he first amendment ... should not permit tie state to
tell the church when it is being "religious" and when it is
not. The church must be permitted to define its own goals in
society in terms of the imperatives of its religious faith. Is the
Christian church somehow not being religious when it works
on behalf of healing the sick, or for the rights of minorities,
or as peacemaker on the international scene? No, the
church itself must define the perimeters of its outreach on
public policy questions.23
In a similar vein, there is a powerful scene in the film about his life in
which the late Archbishop Oscar Romero learns that one of his left-
leaning, rabble-rousing worker-priests has been arrested and tortured
by government thugs. The formerly timid Romero bursts in on the
elegant patio lunch of El Salvador's president-elect, insisting that
something be done about the violence that is consuming their coun-
try. But the president-elect coolly scolds the Archbishop, and blames
the violence on the Church and its radicals, insisting that "the priests
must stay out of politics." "But," those priests' bishop reminds him,
"there are political implications to the Gospel." To which the presi-
dent-elect responds with a smile, "we will take care of those.2 4
In this scene, religion is told both where it belongs-i.e., it is told
that its "implications" will be "take[n] care of" by others; its goals, im-
peratives, and perimeters are defined by others-and, by implication,
what it is. But when religion is content merely to be what government
says it is, or may or should be, then perhaps it really has been, as Jus-
tice Marshall might have predicted, "destroyed.2-5
23 Legislative Activity By Certain Types of Exempt Oiganizations: Hearings Before the House
Wzys and Means Commnittee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 99, 305 (1972) (quoted in GaffTey, supra
note 8, at 20).
24 RormRO (Vidmark /Trimark 1989).
Cf STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 147 (1993) ("[Ilf the state is
able to manipulate the content of religious doctrine througi its power to extend or dncly
the favored tax treatment, then religions are already well down the road to compromising
their autonomy."); Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends To Subti' Legal Oter, 66 FORDHALt L
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I. BUYING THE CHURCHES' SILENCE
The United States has for nearly a century exempted churches--
"[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious
... purposes"26-from federal taxation. 27 In fact, as my colleague Pro-
fessor Rodes observed more than thirty years ago, "[c]hurches have
been wholly or partially exempt from secular taxes since tie time of
Constantine at least[.]"28 Not only this, but the United States permits
donors to deduct from their taxable income contributions to
churches and other similarly exempt entities. 29 It seems, then, that the
United States has benevolently foresworn whatever "power to destroy"
it might enjoy over religion, and has elected instead, by lifting tax
burdens and encouraging charitable gifts, to promote a more "Eras-
tian" relationship30 and to exploit the civic benefits of lived-out faith.31
REv. 1089, 1089 (1998) ("Faith must always resist acculturation, or it will have nothing to
say to the world or to the culture.") (quoting JOHN F KAVANAUGI, THE WORD ENCOUN-
TERED 8 (1996)).
2626 U.S.C. § 501 (c) (3) (1986). See generally, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F, d
137, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (outlining religious organizations' tax status).
27 Ablin, supra note 8, at 547 ("Since the first modern internal revenue law in 1913,
churches have been tax exempt."). The States have, by and large, followed a sinila'
course. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 8, at 383 ("All fifty states and the federal government
have statutory provisions exempting churches from various forms of taxation.") (citing P.
FERARA, RELIGION AND THE CONsTITUTION: A REINTERPRETATION 53 (1983)); see also
Walz v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) ("All of the 50 States provide for tax exemption
of places of worship, most of them doing so by constitutional guarantees. For so long as
federal income taxes have had any potential impact on churches--over 75 years-religious
organizations have been expressly exempt from the tax."). See generally, BRUCE R. 1O-PKINS,
THE LAv OF TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (6th ed. 1992) (discus.sing the history of chari-
table organizations' tax exemptions).
28 Rodes, supra note 9, at 317. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 859 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that property-tax exemptions
"have been in place for over 200 years without disruption to the interests represented by
the Establishment Clause"). For a more detailed discussion, see generallyJohnson, supra
note 10.
29 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (1984).
30 Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguinents in Reli&iously Affiliated American
Law Scools, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1859, 1865 (1993) (noting that, in the Erastian view of the
Church-named for a 16th century Swiss physiciani-the Church "contributes its lhuan
and material resources to the goals of the state, and also acts as a religious witness to public
discussion of moral issues. It prays for the foreign policy of the suate; it blesses the army's
tanks in time of war; and it carries the national flag in its liturgical processions."). See gener-
ally, e.g., Rodes, supra note 9.
31 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 13 n.2 (1989) (noting that, in Wl1z,
"the State might reasonably have determined that religions groups generally contribtute to
the cultural and moral improvement of the community, perform usefil social services, and
enhance a desirable pluralism of viewpoint and enterprise, just as (1o the host of other
nonprofit organizations that qualified for the exemption"); id. at 12 (observing that the
[Vol. 42:771
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But the churches' exemption comes at a price: 2 Like other tax-
exempt charitable organizations, religious communities may not en-
gage in activities and expression that concern or touch upon social
realities and that are regarded by government as excessively political
(or, perhaps, as insufficiently religious).33 Now, we could just regard
these rules as the fair cost to churches of the tax benefits they enjoy,
and perhaps also as reasonable safeguards against abuse of their tax-
exempt status. Or, we could even say that these restrictions on
churches impose no real burdens at all; they merely require charitable
organizations "to pay for [political] activities entirely out of their own
pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to
do."34 On the other hand, it could be that the churches' silence on
political matters, and their retreat fiom the political arena, are no less
valuable to government than the "social services" they provide and
the "cultural and moral improvement of the community" to which
they contribute3 5 That is, we might think the tax exemption is simply
the government's way of paying churches not to talk about certain
things.36
But, of course, churches have been talking about these "things"
for a long time. From the revivalists of the Great Awakening who
exemption at issue in Ilbz "possessed the legitimate secular purpose and effect of contrib-
uting to the community's moral and intellectual diversity and encouraging private groups
to undertake projects that advanced the conununity's well-being and that iould otherwise
have to be funded by tax revenues or left undone").
2 See CARTER, supra note 25, at 147-52 (1993) (describing the 'tradeoff" between the
exemption for churches and the restrictions on their "political" activities as a "Faustian
bargain"); Joseph S. Riapach, Note, Thou Shall Not Politic A PIndpled Approach to &Cron
501(c)(3)'s Prolbition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORnELL L. Rxv. 504, 505 (1999)
("Before a charity can save the world, enlighten the masses, or promote spiritual harnon);
it first must make a deal with the devil.").
- See Gaffney, supra note 8, at 2-3 (noting that "the Internal Revenue Code and many
state statutes modeled on tie federal tax code impose significant restraints on ... religious
communities"). Professor Gaffiiey described these restrictions as part of the "regulation of
the religious activities of churches that touch on political matters." Id. at 29. As Gaffiey
observes, "it would be a lot easier to refer to [these restrictions] as [dealing with] the 'po-
litical activity' of religious organizations," but this would "misunderstand the profoundly
religious character and motivation of the activity." Id. at 29 n.116. I am not suggesting that
the federal tax laws require churches to make sure all their activities are sober and piotus
(Youth-group ski trips?). I do think, though, that tie exemption scheme incorporates an
assumption that churches' activities become less authentically religious as they become
more (to government) recognizably political.
34 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,513 (1959).
ss TeasMontldy, 489 U.S. at 13 n.2.
See Lee, supra note 6, at 434 ("Section 501(c) (3) ... pays churches through tax-
exempt status to be silent on issues deemed by the state to be political.').
July 29001]
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helped pave the way for the American Revolution, to the God-
drenched abolitionist movements that sparked the Civil War; from the
priests, ministers, and rabbis who appealed to the nation's better an-
gels during the Civil Rights movement, to the priests, ministers, and
rabbis who today urge a rejection of the Culture of Death;37 from the
presidential bids of Reverends Jackson and Robertson to the "God
talk"38 that was a staple of the campaigns of Senator Joseph Lieber-
man and now-President George W. Bush-our history, traditions, and
interminable public debates on the social issues are and have always
been awash in religious expression, argument, and activism.
Of course, forceful assertions that religion should "stay out of
politics" 39 are nearly as deeply rooted in our traditions, and so we
should not be surprised by the frequent allegations that particular
religious groups who have entered the political fray are abusing their
tax-exempt status.40 In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the IRS's decision to-"for the first time in its history"--re-
voke "a bona fide church's tax-exempt status because of its involve-
ment in politics."4' In 1992, the Church had placed full-page adver-
tisements in USA Today and The Washington Times urging Christians
not to vote for then-candidate Bill Clinton because of his positions on
certain social and moral issues.42 Not only were these ads found to be
s See generally Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae [The Gospel of Life] (1995), avail-
able at http://wwwv.vatican.va/holy-father/john_paulii/enicyclicals/docttments/lifjp-
ii enc 25031995_evangeliun-vitae_en.html. (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
'1 See, e.g., Cal Thomas, Liberals Afraid ofJohn Asheroft, BALT. SU, Jan. 17, 2001, at 13A
("During the last presidential campaign, there was much 'God-talk' from Vice President Al
Gore and his running mate, Joe Lieberman."); Interview by Lisa Simeone with Wendy
Kaminer, Weekend All Things Considered, Dec. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2146562
("[W]e certainly heard a lot of 'God' talk during the presidential campaign, perhaps from
Joe Lieberman more than anyone else.").
39 See, e.g., Sandy Grady, Holy Candidates-Chill That Religious Prose, Tn. Pomri.AND
OREGONIAN, Sept. 1, 2000, at BI ("Chill the sermons, Holy Joe. Yon too, Dubya. If we
wanted a gospel thumper, we'd elect Billy Graham. God belongs in the heart, not on the
stump.");Jonathan Kirsch, A Cautionary View of Mixing Politics and Religion, LA. Ta ts, Oct.
7, 2000, at B2 (noting that the B'Nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League had urged Senator
Joseph Lieberman to "keep religion out of politics").
40 For example, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State investigates
vigorously and reports alleged violations of the restrictions on political speech by religious
organizations. For more information, see http://www.au.org (last visited May 14, 2001).
4 211 F3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
42Id. at 140. More particularly, the ads carried the headline, "Christians Beware," and
"asserted that then-Governor Clinton's positions concerning abortion, homosexuality, and
the distribution of condoms ... violated Biblical precepts." Id. Because "Bill Clinton is
promoting policies that are in rebellion to God's laws," the ad asked, "how then can we
[Vol. 42:7 1
Taxes, Politics, and the Pivatization of Religion
unlawful, they were criticized as unseemly meddling by religious insti-
tutions in political affairs and as an ominous indication of the "rise of
the Christian right" 43
Political activities by churches, and complaints about them, were
staples of the 2000 election season.4" Consider just two examples: In
California, voters in the March 2000 primary elections were treated to
that State's usual orgy of direct democracy. One of the nearly two
dozen ballot measures up for consideration was Proposition 22, also
known as the "Knight Initiative," which declared "[o]nly marriage be-
tween a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."a
Early on in the campaign season it was observed in the press that the
Initiative was receiving support fi-om, inter alia, the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS).46 These financial and other forms of
support prompted some politicians and watchdog groups to demmd
an examination of the LDS's tax-exempt status.47 Sm Francisco Board
vote for Bill Clinton?" Branch M4inistries v. Rossotti, 40 E Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1999); see
also Anthony Lewis, Christian Right Wnts it Both %iiys: Playing Politics is O, but Don ' Expert
Exemption from Taxes, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 1, 1992, at A15. At the bottom of the ad u-as the pro-
vocative statement, "[t]ax-deductible donations for this advertisement gladly accepted."
Brandi Ministries, 211 E3d at 140. For a copy of the ad, see Lee, stpra, note 6 at 437. In
upholding the revocation, the Court of Appeals rejected, inter alia, the Church's claim that
the revocation violated the First Amendment, noting both that "the Church does not
maintain that a withdrail from electoral politics would violate its beliefs," and that "Con-
gress has not violated [an organization's] First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize
its First Amendment activities." Brand Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142, 143.
4 Ser, e-g., Peter Appleboine, Religious Right ihtensfies Campaign for Bush, N.Y. TemEs.
Oct. 31, 1992, at Al; Lewis, supra note 42, at A15.
44 See generally, e.g., Lee, supra, note 6, at 392-404 (recounting incidents and episodes
from the 2000 election cycle).
45 The proposal passed easily. Carol Ness, Prop 22 Passage Foires Gays to Rtronp, S.F. Ex-
AmiNER, Mar. 8, 2000, at Al.
46Jenifer Warren, 21 Initiatives Await Voters on Stale's March Ballot, LA. TtmEs, Oct. 31,
1999, at A18; see also Martin Kasindorf, No to Ga, Marriage, Vos to Feinstein and Campbell,
U.SA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2000, at 12A ("The state GOP, the Mormon Church and Catholic
bishops backed the proposition. Democrats and leaders of dte state's Methodist, Episcopal
and Presbyterian churches backed the 'No on Knight' side."); Robert Sallada); Mormons
Now Target California: Churd Asks Manbers to Back State Ballot Initiatie, S.F. ExAmINER.July 4,
1999, at Al (noting also that de LDS uas actively and financially involved in recent same-
sex-marriage related political campaigns in Alaska and Hauaii).
47 See Carrie A. Moore, California Polls: A Prop 22 117n, DzsEREr NEWs (Salt Lke City,
Utah), Mar. 5, 2000, at Al (noting that "[t]lie LDS Church has refrained front donating
money to support the initiative, choosing to encourage its membership to support the
proposal with time and money"); Carrie A. Moore, Tax Threat Against Church Assaill, DE-
SERET NEws(Salt Lake Cit; Utah),July 10, 1999, at El (noting that a 'letter was sent to
church leaders throughout the state" which w-as "read to individual adult members" and
which "asked for their voluntary support of [te Knight Initiative]") [hereinafter Tax
Threat].
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of Supervisors member Mark Leno urged the IRS to investigate, while
the Gay and Lesbian Political Action Committee insisted that LDS's
active support "transgresse[d] the autonomy of church and state '18
and was "a gross abuse of their tax-exempt status."49 On the other
hand, such criticisms prompted one legal commentator to decry "the
effort to silence churches" and "to exclude religious institutions and
voices from the public place."50
A year earlier, on the other side of the country, Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State had threatened to
challenge the tax-exempt status of the Catholic Archdiocese of Phila-
delphia after the Archdiocese announced plans to distribute a voter
guide that addressed, among other things, candidates' views on abor-
tion, school vouchers, and gay rights.51 In a letter to Philadelphia's
Cardinal Bevilacqua, Americans United's Rev. Barry Lynn instructed
the Cardinal that such "political materials" were likely in "violation of
federal tax law that prohibits partisan political activity by houses of
worship," and reminded him that churches "are absolutely prohibited
from intervening in political campaigns."5 2 "Churches must stay out of
partisan politics," Lynn urged, "and refrain from attempting to
influence the outcome of elections. It's not only illegal, it runs coun-
ter to the mission of America's faith communities."5 3 Not so, insisted
48 Tax Threat, supra note 47.
49 Edward Epstein, Supervisor Hits Mormons for Politicking, S.F. CuRoN., July 7, 1999, at
A13.
50 Tax Threat, supra note 47. Leno insisted, though, in a letter to the San Francisco Ex-
aminer, that:
[His] concern was not the church's advocacy for passage of the Knight initla-
tive.... Churches and other religious groups in this country have a long and
proud history of participation in the discourse of social policy. WhIat did raise
questions for me was whether a charitable organization such as the Mormon
church can ask its members for their money as well as their vote in support of
a political campaign.
Mark Leno, Letter to the Editor, Why Leno Questions Mormon Role in Anti-Gay-Marriage Issue,
S.F. EXAMINER, July 26, 1999, at A14.
51 See generally, Phila. Archdiocese Is Sued Over Planned Voters' Guide, PrTr. POST-GAZETTrE,
Apr. 3, 1999, at A7. Cf U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, ic., 487
U.S. 72, 74 (1988) (reversing ruling holding Catholic Conference in contempt for failure
to comply with discovery requests in action seeking to revoke tax-exempt status of the Ro-
man Catholic Church because of its pro-life activities).
52 Letter from Barry Lynn to Cardinal Bevilacqua (March 31, 1999), available at
littp://wwvau.org/press/pr331let.htm (last visited May 14, 2001).
53 Press Release, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia Should Drop Plan to
Produce Voter Guides, Says Americans United (March 31, 1999), available at http://www,
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the Archdiocese: "The only responsible course of action for the
Catholic Church is to participate in the debate stauted by others."-4
The point of these few stories is to set up the more general
reflections that follow. As we have seen, religion is often, and perhaps
increasingly, told to "stay out of politics," but is this really desirable, or
even possible? With respect to Rev Lynn's admonition, is it engage-
ment with the world, or is it privatized quietism, that runs "counter to
the mission of America's faith communities"? Can demands that relig-
ious associations and believers concern themselves only with spiritual,
private matters, and assumptions that such demands are reasonable
and realistic, be squared either with our history or with the prophetic,
evangelical, and world-transforming zeal that for so many animates
their faith and motivates their actions? 55
II. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN VOCATION AND AcTvISM
Another scene from Romen. El Salvador's Catholic military vicar
is objecting to Romero's decision to hold a funeral mass in the Cathe-
dral for a priest and two campesinos murdered by the death squads.
"The Church's job is to preach the Gospel," the vica insists, but "this
is going to be interpreted as a political statement." Romero responds,
"I am not trying to make a political statement. I want to draw our
people together."56
au.org/press/pr331922.htm (last visited May 14, 2001). Cf ROIERO, supra, note 24
('There are political implications to the Gospel." "We will take care of those.").
54 Rob Boston, Piladelphia Stoiy, 52 CHURCH & STATE 7, 7 (May 1, 1999), available at
http://-%;%%v:au.org/clurchstte/cs5992.lt1in (last visitedJune 30, 2001).
5 See, eg., Carroll, supra note 8, at 226 ("As Garry Wills has pointed out, the political
involvement of black churches has deep roots running straight back to the miliastic tlteol-
ogy of the Christianized slaves."). Of course, a religious community might refuse, for theo-
logical reasons rooted in its owm traditions, to engage in political disputes or to influence
political decisions. But such a community's lack of interest in politics is viewed by its nen-
bers as the proper response to God's calling and revelation, not as an arrmngement uith,
or an acquiescing to, government. My colleague, Tom Shaffer, has thought and ritten
extensively about these matters. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Review Essay Stephen Carter and
Religion in Amedca, 62 U. CIN. L. RE:. 1601, 1609-12 (1993) (describing and discussing the
"Gathered Church").
56 Rom:Emo, supra note 24.
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I stated at the outset that the exemption-and-restriction scheme
requires government to impose its own meaning on the expression
and activities of mediating institutions. 57 This scheme invites govern-
ment to label as something else-as electioneering, endorsement,
lobbying, etc.-what may be, for a religious association, worship,
evangelism, or prophecy. The above episcopal disagreement from Ro-
mero illustrates the point nicely: How is government to decide what is
really being said-or even what, for its own limited purposes, is being
said-in and through the activities of religious believers in a commu-
nit)?
By way of illustration, recall the exchange between Justices Scalia
and Thomas in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board. v. Pinette.68 In
that case, the Court held that it was not an unconstitutional "estab-
lishment" of religion for Ohio to permit a private party (the Ku Iux
Klan) to "display an unattended religious symbol" (a Latin cross) in a
"traditional public forum located next to its seat of government."5 9
After all, Justice Scalia observed, such "private religious speech, far
from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected ... as
secular private expression."60 What's more, he maintained, constitu-
tionally protected "private religious speech" does not become a con-
stitutionally proscribed establishment or endorsement of religion
simply by its proximity to a government building.61
Justice Thomas wrote separately. Although he agreed that the
Klan's expression was protected, he maintained that the cross display
57 Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650-51 (2000); Mitchell v. Henls, 530
U.S. 793, 828 (2000) ("[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious views required by a fo-
cus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary but also offensive.
It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that courts should refrain from trolling
through a person's or institution's religious beliefs.").
- 515 U.S. 753, 756, 760, 762-71 (1995).
59 Id. at 756.
60 Id. at 760.
61 Id. at 762-70 (plurality op.).Justice O'Connor agreed, though she did not join jus-
tice Scalia in "limit[ing] application of die endorsement test to 'expression by the gov-
ernment itself ... or else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of private
religious expression or activity.'" Id. at 774 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). In her view, rather, "Mien the reasonable observer would view a
government practice [e.g., permitting private religious speech near the seat of govern-
ment] as endorsing religion ... it is [the Court's] duty to hold the practice invalid." Id, at
777 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and concurring in thejudgmnent).
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was best viewed as "a political act, not a Christian one."62 Thomas
noted, "[t]he Klan had a primarily nonreligious purpose in erecting
the cross," and, indeed, "this case may not have truly inolved the Es-
tablishment Clause" at all.63 "While I suspect that Justice Thomas wras
correct about this, the question remains, how could he know? For
Christians, the cross is, of course, a symbol and an expression of the
most profound mysteries of their faith; for the Klan, though, it is
more reasonably regarded as a vehicle for threats, intimidation, and
the political posturing of nativists, racists, and bigots.64 Similarly, a
swastika tattooed on an angry skinhead probably says, and is intended
to say, something very different than one displayed by a devout
Hindu.65 And when Mother Teresa held her rosary in public, she was,
it seems fair to say, saying something quite different than whatever it is
that Madonna Ciccone says when she wears rosary beads while per-
forming.6 6
The Court's recent decisions in Boy Scouts of Amefica u DalO7 and
Mitchell v. HelmszP touch on similar problems. In Dale, the issue was
whether a state law ban on dismissing an assistant scoutmaster be-
cause he is gay unconstitutionally burdened the Scouts' First Amend-
ment right of expressive association. 69 The general rule, the Justices
agreed, is that "an expressive association may exclude an unwanted
member if to include him would significantly undermine its expres-
sive capabilities," or would alter, distort, or commandeer the content
02 Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 771 (Thonas, J., concurring)
("[T]o the extent that the Klan had a message to communicate in Capitol Square, it was
primarily a political one.").
63 Id. at 771 (Thomas,J., concurring).
64 See id. at 770-71 (Thomas,J., concurring).
6 Comnpare, eg., Abdon M. Pallasch, Hindu Files Suit to Challenge Swastika Fing. Cill.
Thm., Aug. 6, 1998, at 4 (describing a workplace incident involving a swastika as a Hindu
religious symbol), and Kaushal -t Hyatt Regency Woodfield, 1999 WL 436585 *1, *3 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) (N"hile the swastika may have a revered place in the [Hindu] religious world ...
it is also one of the most offensive and condemned symbols in mutch of the United States
and the western world."), winth, eg., AMERMCAN HISTORY X (New Line Productions, Inc..
1998).
6 Cf, e-g., People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P. 610, 617 (Colo. 1927) ("[Ilt is not
easier but probably harder to determine what is or is not religious than what is or is not
sectarian. What parts of Longfellow or Holmes are religious? Is the Hynn to the Night or
the Chambered Nautilus or Lincoln's Second inaugural religious or not?'), omerrld by
Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662,662 (Colo. 1982).
7 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
- 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
69 Dale 530 U.S. at 644.
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of the messages expressed.70 In order to decide, then, whether the
anti-discrimination norms embodied in the State's law had to yield to
the Scouts' freedoms of association and expression, the Court had to
determine, first, what the Scouts' message actually was.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey had determined that, because
promotion of "the view that homosexuality is immoral" was not a
"shared goal of Boy Scout members," the application of the State's
anti-discrimination law in Mr. Dale's case would not "affect in any
significant way [the Boy Scouts'] existing members' ability to carry
out their various purposes."7' That is, because the Scouts' purpose
and message were not really what the Scouts said they were, the state-
law requirement that it not discriminate against gay members and
leaders would neither burden nor alter that message. 72
But the Court disagreed. Like the New Jersey court, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist asked "whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant
scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advo-
cate public or private viewpoints," and he acknowledged that "[t]his
inquiry necessarily requires us first to explore, to a limited extent, the
nature of the Boy Scouts' view of homosexuality."7' The Dale majority
was reluctant, though, to second-guess the Scouts with respect to the
content or consistency of its message or the extent to which that mes-
sage would be burdened or altered by having a gay man as an assistant
scoutmaster: Just "[a] s we give deference to an association's assertions
regarding the nature of its expression," the Chief Justice insisted, "we
must also give deference to an association's view of what would impair
its expression." 74 And so, the Court accepted-pretty much at face
value-the Scouts' assertion that it teaches, and that one of its pur-
70 The Supreme Court 1999 Term--Leading Cases-Freedom of Association, 114 1lAlo. L
REx. 259, 259 (2000) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 609 (1984); N.Y. Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537, 537 (1987)).
71 Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also id. at 650-
51 ("The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts' beliefs and found that the
'exclusion of members solely on the basis of their sexual orientation is inconsistent with
Boy Scouts' commitment to a diverse and 'representative' membrship ... [and] contra-
dicts Boy Scouts' overarching objective to reach 'all eligible youth.'") (citation omitted).
72 See generally Dale v. Boy Scouts of An., 734 A.2d 1196, 1228-29 (NJ. 1999), rev'd 530
U.S. 640 (2000).
73 Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
74 Id. at 651-55; see also id. at 653-57.
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poses is to teach, certain things about the morality of human sexuality,
one of which is that homosexuality is wrong.75
Having arrived at this interpretation, the Court then concluded
that New Jersey's public accommodations law threatened to co-opt the
Scouts' expression and muddy its clarity by forcing it "to send a mes-
sage, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts
accepts homosexuality as a legitimate form of behavio." 7 6 For present
purposes, though, the point is that before the Court could decide
whether the anti-discrimination laws unconstitutionally burdened the
Scouts' freedom of expressive association, it first had to identi, and
interpret its expression.
At first glance, Mitchell v. Hehns is an entirely different case, pre-
senting entirely different questions. There, the Court decided that the
federal "Chapter 2" program-through which government-ownied
educational materials and equipment are loaned to public, private,
and parochial schools-does not violate the First Amendment.77 A
legal stumbling block for the program had been the Court's focus in
previous school-aid cases on whether or not the schools in question
were "pervasively sectarian."78
Justice Thomas would have "buried" this inquiry.79 As he pointed
out, not only had the pervasively-sectarian inquiry too often served as
a way to launder anti-Catholic biases,8 0 the inquiry itself was "offen-
sive": "[C]ourts should refrain... fiom trolling through a person's or
institution's religious beliefs," and fi-om searching for signs that the
75 Id at 653. But see id. at 669-478 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (concluding tiat the record
contained insufficient evidence of a coherent position on de matter).
,6 Id. at 653.
77 See Mitdwl, 530 U.S. at 808.
78 530 U.S. at 826 (plurality 0p.) ("The dissent is correct that there was a period when
this factor mattered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian school w.,-as a primary or sec-
ondary school.").
79 Id. at 829 ("In short, nothing in the Establishment Clatse requires the excltsion of
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other doc-
trines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.').
80 Id. at 828-29 (noting that "hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a
shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow"). See genrrally, e.g., Richard A. Baer.
Jr., The Supmne Court's Discriminatory, Use of the Tet "Seradan, "6J. L & Pot. 449, (1990).
It is worth noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
cently ruled, in an opinion by ChiefJudge Wilkinson, that Mitcdell had, in fact, "buried"
the presumption that government aid to "pervasively sectarian" schools is unconstitutional.
Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 E3d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 2001). In an abundance of
caution, though, the court went on to affirm, as not clearly erroneous, the district court's
finding that the College is not, in fact, pervasively sectarian. Id. at 508-09.
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school "take [s] ... [its] religion seriously, . . . [or] think[s] that...
religion should affect the whole of... [our] lives."'
Justice Thomas's aversion to such "trolling" brings us back to the
line-drawing required by the conditional-exemption scheme. If, as he
suggests, caution is appropriate when courts examine the beliefs and
practices of an aid-receiving educational institution for evidence of
excessive or insufficiently compartmentalized religiosity, it seems war-
ranted as well when government attempts to separate out and meas-
ure the politics-or, again, the insufficiently compartmentalized re-
ligiosity-in a religious association's activities and expression.
Another illustration: About five years ago, the Department of De-
fense prohibited military chaplains from urging parishioners to join a
postcard campaign calling for the override of President Clinton's veto
of the partial-birth-abortion ban.8 2 The Department insisted that such
exhortations would violate departmental regulations as well as federal
laws governing lobbying activities by government employees.8 3 Father
Vincent Rigdon, a Catholic priest, joined by the Muslim American
Military Association, a rabbi with the Air Force, and others, objected
to the order, insisting that those he served "have a right to a real chap-
lain, not a tame one, and to real homilies, not censored ones."'1
Judge Stanley Sporkin, of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, agreed with Father Rigdon. He concluded,
among other things, that the military directive prohibiting chaplains
from encouraging churchgoers to participate in the pro-life postcard
81 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827-28.
82 Rigdon v. Perry, 962 E Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1997). The Catholic bishops had in-
augurated in the spring of 1996 a "Project Life Postcard Campaign," which "consisted of
Catholic priests throughout tie country preaching to their parishioners against an abor-
tion procedure known ... colloquially as 'partial birth abortion.'" Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at
150, 152; see also Toni Locy, 1V7tich Boss to Obey-Churh or Air Fone?, Tm SExrLE TsIES,
Oct. 9, 1996, atA10.
8 Rigdon, 962 F Supp. at 153. The Department also argued, among other things, that
the ban was required because otherwise those in the pews might confuse their ministers'
exhortations with orders from a superior officer. See generally Toni Locy, Military Chaplains'
Rights Upheld; Ban on UrgingAntiabortion Letters to Congress Faulted by Courl, TE WiASi. PosT,
Apr. 7, 1997, at A19; Timothy Lynch, Dereliction of Duty: The Constitntional Record of President
Clinton, 27 CAP. U. L. REv. 783, 789-90 (1999).
m' Lynch, supra note 83, at 790 (quoting Doug Landow, Militaly Yardstick of Religious
Freedom?, WASH. TirEs, Aug. 14, 1996, at A19). Another plaintiff in the case, Rabbi Davil
Kaye, noted that "it is impossible, indeed incoherent, to separate moral teachings from
Judaism. And when a law is immoral, [lie] believe[d] that as a Rabbi (lie] [could] not re-
main silent." Furthe, lie insisted, "as a Rabbi, I must tell my Congregation that this
abomination must not be allowed to continue in a society that calls itself just." Rigdon, 962
E Supp. at 154.
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campaign "muzzl[ed] ... religious guidance" in violation of the First
Amendment.85 Of particular interest, though, is the fact that Judge
Sporkin explicitly rejected the government's claim that Father Rig-
don's pro-life expression was "really 'political,' not religious." After all,
the court noted, the government had not provided any "basis for the
Court in this case to distinguish the political fiom the religious."86 He
continued:
Father Rigdon's desire to urge his Catholic parishioners to
contact Congress on legislation that would limit what he and
many other Catholics believe to be an immorll practice... is
no less religious in character than telling parishioners that it
is their Catholic duty to protect every potential human life
by not having abortions and by encouraging others to follow
suit. Writing to Congress is but one way in which Catholics
can fulfill this duty, and it coincidentally involves comnmuni-
cating with the political branches of government.
What's more,Judge Sporkin insisted, "[e]ven assuming, arguendo,
that Father Rigdon's intended speech is in some sense political, it is
not the role of this Court to draw fine distinctions between degrees of
religious speech and to hold that religious speech is protected but
religious speech with so-called political overtones is not."87 Judge
Sporkin would have shared, I suspect, Justice Thomas's expressed re-
luctance in Mitchell to "troll[I through a person's or institution's relig-
ious beliefs," searching warily for signs that these beliefs are being
8, Rigdon, 962 . Supp. at 163-64. "What we have here,"Judge Sporkin concluded, "is
the government's attempt to override the Constitution and the laws of the land by a direc-
tive that clearly interferes with military daplains' free-exercise and free-speech rights, as
well as those of their congregants." Id. at 165; see also Toni Locy, supra note 83, at A19.
Kevin Hasson of the Becket Fund for Religious Libert; and counsel for tile objecting
clergy remarked, "In over 200 years, our government has never before attempted to censor
a sermon. I hope Judge Sporkin's opinion makes this first attempt ... [its] last." Tony
Snow; Judge Rejects C inton Attack on Militan, Chaplains' Free Speech Rigats, ST. Louis PosT-
DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 1997, at B7.
Judge Sporkin also concluded that it did not violate federal law or regulations for mili-
tary chaplains to encourage congregants to weigh in on pending legislation, and that-
even if it did-sudi a prohibition would iolate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a), (b). Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at 156-62.
8Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at 164.
17 Id. (quoting Widmar -, Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 n.7 (1981) (refusing to distin-
guish "religious worship" from "speech about religion" and insisting that "even if the dis-
tinction drew an arguably principled line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the
judicial competence to administer")).
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taken too seriously, accumulating excessive "political overtones," and
bursting the barriers of the private sphere where they belong.88
Consider, finally, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Good
News Club v. Milford Central School89 The case involved Milford's
"Community Use of School Facilities Policy," which permits Milford
residents and local groups to use school facilities for "social, civic and
recreational meetings and entertainment events and other uses per-
taining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall
be nonexclusive and shall be open to the general public."0 Policies
like this are common, make good sense, and serve the common good.
By opening public property to private groups, they support the web of
mediating institutions and associations-the "little platoons" of de-
mocracy-that is essential to a diverse and thriving civil society. But
the Milford Policy did not permit all "uses pertaining to the welfare of
the community" in school facilities; it stated that "[sichool premises
shall not be used by any individual or organization for religious pur-
poses."9 1
The Good News Club is a "nondenominational," "community-
based Christian youth organization open to children between the ages
of six and twelve" whose "stated purpose is to instruct children in fam-
ily values and morals from a Christian perspective."92 When the Club
asked permission to use the school cafeteria for one hour a week, its
request was denied. As the Milford Superintendent explained, "[y] our
group's request to use the school facilities indicated such use would
be for the purpose of 'hearing a bible lesson and memorizing scrip-
ture.' I understand such proposed uses would be the equivalent of
religious worship, which is prohibited under [the] policy, rather than
the expression of religious views or values on a secular subject mat-
ter. ,03
88 See Alan Wolfe, Ye of Little Faith, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 3, 2000, at 29 (reviewing and
quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS Or RELIGION
IN POLITICS (2000) ("Religion has no sphere. It possesses no natural bounds, It is not
amenable to being pent up.")). Cf Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) (noting
the asserted "hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena").
8 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
90 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 21 F. Supp. 2(1147, 150 (N.D.NY. 1998).
91 Id. Milford's Policy was adopted pursuant to section 414 of the New York Education
Law, which "authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations for the use of
school facilities." Id. at 149 n.2 (quoting section 414).
92 Id. at 149.
93 Id. at n.3 (quoting Letter of Robert McGruder, Oct. 3, 1996).
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The Club then filed a civil rights lawsuit, claining that Milford's
refusal violated, among other things, the free speech rights of the
Club and its members. The Club evidently conceded that Milford
could prohibit the use of its facilities for "religious purposes"; it simply
insisted that its activities were "secular in nature," much like those of
the Boy Scouts or the 4-H Club. "The only difference," the Club col-
tended, was that the Club "conveys its message 'fion a Christian per-
spective by using Bible stories, games, scripture, and religious
songs.'"9 Therefore, Milford's exclusion of the Club amuounted to un-
constitutional "viewpoint discrimination."9 5
The district court agreed with Milford that the "Club's activities
are more appropriately classified as religious instruction and wor-
ship,"96 and rejected the Club's First Amendment challenge. 97 Along
the way, the court provided a "detailed discussion of the Club's activi-
ties," one resembling, one might think, the "trolling" disapproved in
MitchelL The court emphasized, for example, that Club meetings typi-
cally involve prayer and "formal instruction" in a "classroom-type set-
ting"; that "central to [the Club's] 'perspective' is the children's ac-
ceptance of Jesus Christ into their lives" and the view that "you need
the LordJesus to help you to be able to give you the power actually to
live a moral life"; that the Bible is used to instruct children in this per-
spective; that "unsaved" children are "invite[d]" by the teacher "to
trust the LordJesus to be your Savior from sin"; and that children are
"read 'missionary stories' that 'spread tile gospel' and encourage Bi-
ble study."98 These activities, the court concluded, were "characteristic
of formal religious instruction" as well as "worship activities that in-
culcate Christian religion and values."99 The Club's purposes, the
court stated, are to "pass along Christian faith and morality"; to em-
phasize the "importance of having a relationship wmtiu Christ"; to "in-
vite" children to "accept Jesus Christ into tlleir lives"; and to "chal-
lenge" them to "follow God's word."10° In the end, the court
9Id. at 154.
95 Good News, 21 . Supp. 2d at 154.
96 Id. ("A careful analysis of the Club's actities reveads that its subject matter is decid-
edly religious in nature, and not merely a discussion of secular matters from a religious
perspective that is otlerwise permitted under the District's use policies.").
97 Id. at 160 ("T]Ihe District's denial of Good News' requests to use ... [Milford's] fa-
cilities was consistent wid its prior practice and use and thus constitutionally sound.").
98 Id. at 154-57 (summarizing "genre" of Club's activities); see also Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. School, 202 F3d 502,504-07 (2d Cir. 2000).
99 Id. at 157.
100 Good News, 21 E Supp. 2d. at 157-58.
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concluded, "Good News is a religious youth organization whose pro-
posed use deals specifically with religious subject matter-and not...
merely a religious perspective on secular subject matter."10 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed. It rejected the Club's viewpoint discrimination argument
because, like the district court, it concluded, "the Good News Club is
doing something other than simply teaching moral values." 102 It ex-
pressed confidence that it "is not difficult for school authorities to
make the distinction between the discussion of secular subjects from a
religious viewpoint and the discussion of religious material through
religious instruction and prayer," and agreed that "the activities of the
Club fall clearly on the side of religious instruction and prayer."'1S As
the Second Circuit saw it, the Club did not merely express a "view-
point on morality'----"morality" being a "secular subject"--or teach
that a "relationship with God is necessary to make moral values mean-
ingful"; it also "focused on teaching children how to cultivate their
relationship with God through Jesus Christ," a "quintessentially relig-
ious" project.104
In my view,105 the Second Circuit's confidence that it is "not
difficult for school authorities to make the distinction between the
discussion of secular subjects from a religious viewpoint and the dis-
cussion of religious material through religious instruction and prayer"
was quite misplaced.106 Judge Jacobs, in dissent, put the matter well:
"When the subject matter is morals and character, it is quixotic to at-
tempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious subject
matters[,] "1°7 and "[w]henever public officials ... evaluate private
speech 'to discern [its] underlying philosophic assumptions respect-
101 Id. at 160.
102 Good News, 202 E.d at 510.
1
03 Id.
104 Id. Cf Good News/Good Sports Club v. Ladue, 28 F.d 1501, 1517-18 (8th Cir.
1994) (Bright,J., dissenting) ("[T]he Club is fundamentally a Christian organization, the
primary purpose of which is to instill and reinforce Christian faith and %itles.... The
Scouts, by contrast, are a secular organization.").
105 1 was a co-author of an amicus curiae brief filed in the United States Supreme Court
by the Christian Legal Society and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of Amer-
ica in support of the Good News Club.
106 Cf Rigdon, 962 E Supp. at 164 (noting that "it is not the role of this Court to (rIw
fine distinctions between degrees of religious speech and to hold that religious speech is
protected but religious speech with so-called political overtones is not"); see also Ilihnar,
454 U.S. at 270 n.6 (refitsing to distinguish "religious worship" from "speech about relig,
ion" and insisting that "even if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is highly
doubtful that it would lie within thejudicial competence to administer").
107 Good News, 202 E.d at 512 (Jacobs,J., dissenting).
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ing religious theory and belief,' the result is 'a denial of the right of
free speech. '" 10 8 This is because, again, courts and governments lack
the competence and cannot reasonably be trusted to identify that
precise point where private expression crosses an imagined Rubicon
of religiosity separating religious viewpoints on secular subjects-such
as morals-from religious instruction and worship.10 9
Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's
decision, with six Justices agreeing that it violated the First Amend-
ment's viewpoint-neutrality requirement to deny the Club equal ac-
cess to Milford's facilities." 0 Interestingly, though, Justice Thomas's
opinion for the majority had little to say about the wisdom or consti-
tutionality of government efforts to draw the line between religious
worship, on the one hand, and the religious perspective, on the
other."' Instead, the Court stated that even "quintessentially relig-
108 Id. at 515 (quoting Rosenberger 'v. Rectors & risitors of the Univ of Va., 515 U.S.
819,845 (1995)).
109 See, e-g., Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2110-11 (ScaliaJ., concurring) ("If the distinction
did have content, it would be beyond the courts' competence to administer... And if
courts ... were competent, applying the distinction would require state monitoring of
private, religious speech with a degree of pervasiveness that we have previously fountd tn-
acceptable."); Widmnar, 454 U.S. at 272 11.11 ("We agree ... that the University would risk
greater 'entanglement' by attempting to enforce its exclusion of 'religious worship' and
'religious speech.' Initially, the University would need to determine which words and ac-
tivities fall within 'religious worship and religious teaching.' This alone could prove 'an
impossible task in an age where many mid various beliefs meet the constitutional
definition of religion.'") (citations omitted).
110 Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100; see also id. at 2109 (ScaliaJ., concurring) ('rhis is bla-
tant viewpoint discrimination."). Five Justices also concluded that exclusion wvas not re-
quired by the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2103-07.Justice Breyer also agreed that, "view-
ing the disputed facts ... favorably to tie Club ... [Milford] has not shown an
Establishment Clause violation." Id. at 2112 (Breye; J., concurring in part). He emnpha-
sized, though, his .iLew that "both parties ... should have a fair opportunity to fill the evi-
dentiary gap in light of today's opinion." Id. (BreyerJ., concurring in part).
M Indeed, injustice Thomas's viei%; the Second Circuit never actually determined that
the Club's activities were"religious worship"; rather, it simply compared the Club's activities
to worship. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2102 n. 4. Cf. Good Nns, 202 E3d at 510 (i[W]e believe
that the school authorities, after thorough inquiry and deliberation, correctly determined
that the activities of the Club fall clearly on the side of religious instruction and prayer.");
("It is difficult to see how tie Club's activities differ materially from the 'religious worship'
described [in other cases]."). Id.Justices Souter and Ginsburg, on the other hand, were of
the view that "[i]t is beyond question that Good News intends to use the public school
premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view,
but for an evangelical service of worship[.]" Good Nt s, 121 S. Ct. at 2117 (SotterJ., dis-
senting); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("This writing is no
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ious" expression can, for First Amendment purposes, be "character-
ized properly as the teaching of morals and character development
from a particular viewpoint."11 2 The Court saw "no logical difference
in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the
invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to
provide a framework for their lessons," and refused to conclude that
"reliance on Christian principles taints moral and character instruc-
tion in a way that other foundations for thought or viewpoints do
not."ll3
Although the Good News Court reversed the Second Circuit's de-
cision, its conclusion, in a footnote, that the Club's activities were not
"mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values,"
suggests the same misplaced confidence in courts' powers of theo-
logical interpretation as did the ruling of the Court of Appeals.""4
What criteria, we might ask, would the Court have used to identify
"mere religious worship" that was "divorced from any teaching of
moral values" or-returning to the tax exemption--from other "secu-
lar" matters, like "politics"? Justice Stevens's dissent raises similamr and
perhaps even thornier, problems. His fear was not that the Club's ac-
tivities might have crossed the line between discussion from a relig-
ious viewpoint and "worship," but instead the boundary between such
discussion and "religious proselytizing."115 But again, how is govern-
ment possibly to identify the point at which a religious speaker starts
merely descriptive examination of religious doctrine.... Nor is it merely the expression of
editorial opinion.... It is straightforward exhortation to enter into a relationship with
God as revealed in Jesus Christ[.]"). They also dismissed as "semantic" Justices Thoias's
conclusion that the Second Circuit never actually determined that the Club's activities
were "worship." Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2117 n.3 (SouterJ., dissenting).
112 Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2102.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2102 n.4.
115 Id. at 2113 (Stevens,J., dissenting). In his view, "just as a school may allow meetings
to discuss current events from a political perspective without also allowing organized po.
litical recruitment, so too can a school allow discussion of topics such as moral develop.-
ment from a religious (or nonreligious) perspective without thereby opening its forum to
religious proselytizing or worship." i. But see id. at 2109 (Scaliaj., concurring) (arguing
that it is "blatant viewpoint discrimination" to say that "[tihe Club may not ... inlepend-
ently discuss the religious premise on which its views are based ... [amid] may not seek to
persuade the children that the premise is true"); id. at 2110 (Scalia,J., concurring) ('rlhe
right to present a viewpoint based on religion carrie[s] with it tIhe right to defend the
premise.").
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caring too much about what she says, or trying too hard to convince
her listeners?116
I cannot provide here the detailed discussion that Good News de-
serves and will certainly provoke. For my pu-poses, though, the point
to be emphasized is this: At the heart of the Good News case is the
same constitutional and theological problem that lurks in the prohibi-
tions on "political" activities by tax-exempt entities. That is, the opin-
ions in Good News, like the statutory restrictions on churches' political
activities, call for caution. They should prompt us to wonder how gov-
ernment is able to distinguish religious purposes from secular ones,
worship from perspective, discussion from proselytization. In other
words, Justice Souter's admission in the gr-aduation-prayer case, Lee u
Weismian, seems particularly appropriate here: "I can hardly imagine a
subject less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or
more deliberately to be avoided where possible," than "compar-ative
theology."11 7
Ill. TEACHING THROUGH LABELS AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF
RELIGION
I have tried to show that for government to identify and police a
boundary between religious activities md political activities is a trick-
ier task than the Second Circuit was able to admit in Good News v. Mui-
ford Central SclwoL To which one response might be, "Yes, it is hard,
but so what?" That the line is hard to draw is not, in itself, a compel-
ling reason not to draw it, particularly in light of the government's
asserted interests in enforcing it.118 Are there anly other drawbacks,
besides difficulty? -
Justice Scalia might counter, as he did in Good NAeos, by pointing
to the entanglements between religion and government that would
accompany comparative-theology-driven boundary maintenance by
116 Even if government officials could identifylis point, it is not clear why they should
be able to act upon it. After all, "[e]ffectiveness in preseting a vmi-point rests on the per-
suasiveness with which ie speaker defends his premise[.]" Id. at 2109 (Scalia.J., concur-
ring); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844 ('Were the dissent's view to become lass: it would
require the University ... to scrutinize the content of student speech, lest the expression
in question ... contain too great a religious content.").
117 505 U.S. 577, 616-17 (1992) (SouterJ., concurring).
11s See, eg., Good Ne-s Club v. Milford Cent. School, 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2114 (2001)
(StevensJ., dissenting) ('The line between the various categories of religious speech may
be difficult to draw, but I think tlat the distinctions are valid, and that a school ... must be
permitted to draw them.").
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courts between faith and activism.119 Others might agree with the
Mitchell v. Helms plurality, and reject as "offensive" the government
"trolling" through beliefs that must inevitably accompany such main-
tenance. 120 Still others might worry, citing the decision in Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America, that by inspecting associations' activities in order to
identify their true import or significance, government might intrude
on the freedom of expressive association. 121
Let me suggest, though, another counter-response to the "so
what?" question: By determining for its own purposes the meaning of
religious communities' statements and activities, and by enforcing the
distinctions it draws, government subtly reshapes religious conscious-
ness itself.122 In other words, by telling religion what it may say, really
is saying, or will be deemed to have said, and by telling faith where it
belongs, government molds religion's own sense of what it is.125
Now, the Supreme Court has told us time and again-it is practi-
cally black-letter law-that "[our] Constitution decrees that religion
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institu-
tions of private choice."124 In the 2000 Term's "football prayer" case,
for example, a comfortable majority of the Justices reaffirmed that the
"transmission of religious beliefs and worship" is a "responsibility and
a choice committed to the private sphere."12 5
Similar pronouncements led my colleague, Professor Bradley, to
suggest in another context that "[t]he Court is now clearly committed
to articulating and enforcing a normative scheme of 'private' relig-
ion."126 Indeed, he argues powerfully that the Court's post-Everson v.
119 Id. at 2111 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtznman, 403 U.S, 602,
620 (1971) ("This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a
religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution for-
bids.").
120 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
121 See530 U.S. 640, 653-57 (2000).
122 Cf Bradley, supra note 15, at 277 (arguing that the Court's Religion Clause juris-
prudence is "most profitably understood as [a] judicial attempt to move religion into the
realm of subjective preference by eliminating religious consciousness").
12 See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L.
REv. 263, 268 (1992) (noting that some read the Establishment Clause as having been
designed to "keep religion its place; that is, out of the public discourse to the greatest ex-
tent possible").
124 Lenon, 403 U.S. at 625 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 52 (1947) (Rutledge,J., dissenting) (noting that the "religious fiuncton"
is "altogether private").
125 Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (quoting Lee v,
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,589 (1992)).
126 See Bradley, supra note 15, at 276-77.
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Board of Education cases "are most profitably understood as judicial
attempts to move religion into the realm of subjective preference by
eliminating religious consciousness."127 In marked contrast to Jaunes
Madison's "high-stakes constitutional gamble"--his "hope[] to
achieve manageable conflict fueled by diversity and freedom," in re-
ligion as in other matters-the Court turned to privatization "as the
'final solution' to the problem of religious faction."l28 Its ambition-
not merely the unintended effect of its decisions-is not only to
confine the potentially subversive messages of religion to a "nonpub-
lic ghetto,"'2 but also to revise and privatize the messages themselves.
Having acquiesced to judicial declarations that it is a private matte;
and accepted that its authority is entirely subjective, religious con-
sciousness is unable to resist the conclusion that its clai'ms to public
truth are "implausible nonsense," and therefore cannot help but con-
cede the field of public life and morality to government."30
Although I cannot flesh out the argument here, it strikes me that
the exemption-and-restriction scheme, the line-drawing it invites, and
the assumptions it reflects might also be "profitably understood" as
part of a "normative scheme of 'private' religion." To be clea; this
privatization of religion is not simply its institutional disestablishment
or an entirely appropriate respect on government's part for individual
freedom of conscience and the autonomy of religious institutions.131
Nor is the claim only that the exemption privatizes religion by deter-
ring political activism and silencing political advocacy by religious be-
lievers and communities. It is, instead, that the exemption scheme
and its administration subtly re-form religion's conception of itself.
Government evaluates and characterizes what churches say and do,
and decides both what it will recognize as religious and what it will
127 Bradley, supra note 15, at 277; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal De-
mocray, 59 U. Cm. L. RE%. 195, 211 (1992) ("[N]ot all diisive and controversial questions
have been prixatized by the Constitution; only religious questions have.").
12 8 Bradley, supra note 15, at 276, 277; see also id. at 330 (frhe sad[] truth may be that
the Court indeed perceives itself as doing the dirty but indispensable work of saving the
republic from faith unchained and are, thus, sadly obliged to reject Madison's gallant
gamble.").
12 Id. at 280.
130 Id.; see also id. at 297 (stating that "privatization" thesis is that "if religion possesses
any objective truth claims at all, they are not public truths").
131 See generally, eg., SECOND VATN A ECmfENICAL CouNcit, DIGNiTATIs lIUMANAE
[Declaration on Religious Liberty] 1 2 (1965) (insisting upon the freedom of conscience
in matters of religion, and grounding freedom in the dignity of the human person) alail-
able at http://www.atican.-/archive/Ist-councils/ii -vaticucotm nci/documnents/vat-
ii decl_ 19651207_dignitatis-liumaniae_eln.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
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label as political.13 2 The identification of certain activities by religious
associations as inappropriate irruptions of faith into the political
sphere, and the criteria used to identify such irruptions, allow gov-
ernment to tame religion, and to "blunt [its] political saliency," by
identifying what it is not.133
If this is correct, then the privatization of religion is its re-making
by government and its transformation from a comprehensive and
demanding account of the world to a therapeutic "cocoon wrapped
around the solitary individual." 13 It is a state-sponsored change in
religious believers' own notions of what their faith means and what it
requires. It is the process by which government domesticates the
churches' evangelical vocation and convinces religion to see itself as a
socially impotent force that does not belong in politics. The govern-
ment tells faith communities that religion is a private matte; and,
eventually, they come to believe it. But as the theologian Johann Metz
has observed, the "eschatological promises of biblical tradition-lib-
erty, peace, justice, reconciliation-cannot be made private. They
force one ever anew into social responsibility."11 5 And so, when relig-
ion-whether because of the didactic effects of the tax law, or for any
other reason-becomes content to be what government says it is or
should be, then maybe, in ChiefJustice Marshall's words, it really has
been "destroyed."136
IV. THE MONOTONOUS PUBLIC SQUARE
The administration of the churches' conditional tax exemption
embroils government in the difficult business of distinguishing wor-
ship and ministry from electioneering and political advocacy. In
marking these boundaries, government sends the message and rein-
forces the belief that religion is a private matter, of private import, for
132 See Bradley, supra note 15, at 276-77.
133 Id. at 277, 279 ("Wahat is 'religion'? How does it descriptively irrupt into 'politics,'
and what follows from these irruptions? And, most importantly, by what criteria are those
effects judged desirable or undesirable?").
134 Id. at 293.
135 JOHANNEs B. MErz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD 153 (Glen-)oepcl trans., 1969), see
also Bradley, supra note 15, at 277 (arguing that "religious consciousness" is "the conviction
that religion contains objectively true insights into human social existence"); id. at 329
("Political norms have no necessary influence on religious communities, yet religion's
encompassing account of existence necessarily influences the polis.").
136 See Bradley, supra note 15, at 293 ("It is not easy to see how religion .. can be coin-
partmentalized within a 'private' area, much less prosper there.").
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the private sphere. And, eventually, religion embraces and incorpo-
rates this view.
This privatization point leads to anothe, final, concern: That the
government's assignment of its own meanings to what churches do,
and what government and law say about the place of religion in pub-
lic life, threaten to further denude the "public square" I 7 and weaken
the much-remarked structures of civil society.I s8 In other words, it is
not only religious consciousness that suffers when fiith is told its
place. Rather, the privatization of faith and its retreat to the sphere
assigned to it by the state will likely be accompanied by a similar re-
treat of authentically religious associations and by the hollowing out
of civil society.1s9 When government constructs a boundary between
religion (which is private) and public life; and when religious people
and associations embrace and internalize this boundary we should
not be surprised when the churches stop functioning as intermediate
institutions. Having taken their cue from the state as to what they
should be, religious associations retreat to private life, to subjectivity.
But a church that accepts its banishment from civil society, and whose
mission is more therapeutic than transforming, cannot really be ex-
pected to serve as a buffe, to mediate between persons and the state,
or to compete with the liberal state for our values and loyalties. 140
This retreat is troubling, first, because even though faith ulti-
mately inheres in persons, it also depends on institutions and associa-
tions for its transmission. History demonstrates that faith can flourish
in times of persecution; nonetheless, it requires mediating associa-
tions to thrive, if only to filter and counter competing messages. 41
Retreat is also regrettable because, as Professor Gaffney has suggested,
"being in trouble with the State is one of the marks or sure signs of
137 See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED Punuc SQUARRI REUGION AND
DnioczAcy IN A mRICA (2d ed. 1986).
l 8 See generaily, Symposium, supra note 17.
139 1 do not mean, with this talk of privatization and retreat, to ignore the endless (and
tedious) expressions of civil religion, ceremonial deism, 'Ainerican Shinto," and treacly
piety that, all admit, are staples of our cultural life. SeejoirN WITrE,JR., REUGION AND TilE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT. ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 236 (2000).
140 See Garnett, supra note 12, at 1853 ("[A]ssociations are about social structure as
much as self-expression. They get in the xwayjust as they facilitate. They are the hedgerows
of civil society. They are wTenches in the works of whatever hegemonizing ambitions go'.-
ernment might be tempted to indulge.").
141 This is not to say that the function of religious commnunities is simply to mediate
and compete in civil society. For example, many Christian denominations and traditions
speak of the Church as "the body of Clrist." Se&, e.g., 1 Coyntlhians 12:1-31; The Catechisn
of the Catholic Churcli 11787-795 ('The Church-Body of Christ") (1994).
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the church's authenticity."142 But a church that has retreated, and
whose consciousness has been remade to cohere with state-drawn
lines between spheres, is less likely to get into such trouble with gov-
ernment. And finally, the retreat of religious associations to the pri-
vate sphere suggests an ill-founded confidence that government will
not follow. But it will. The privatization of religion is a one-way
"ratchet that stems the flow of religious current into the public
sphere, but does not slow the incursion of political norms into the
private realm."' 43
We should not think that this hollowing out of civil society is bad
only for religion. A free and liberal society, and the goods for which it
aims, depend on a busy and crowded public square. They require-
because the formation of citizens requires-the activity and voices of
independent associations. They require mediating institutions to
serve as social scaffolding and to "contribute[] to the public good by
inculcating ideas of public and private virtue."1 4  And they do this--
perhaps counter-intuitively-sometimes by obstructing, rather than co-
operating with, the government's projects; they compete with, and do
not merely echo or amplify, the state's voice in the formation of per-
sons. The classical liberal hope, remember, is that this kind of compe-
tition is more likely than state-sponsored homogenization to nurture
civic virtue and produce citizens oriented toward the conunon
good.145
Religious communities are crucial sources for the kind of coun-
ter-speech that liberal governments should expect and free societies
14 Gaffney, supra note 123, at 303.
143 Bradley, supra note 15, at 324. Cf BobJones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983)
(denying tax-exempt status to private school that discriminated, for assertedly religious
reasons, on the basis of race, because such discrimination is against "public policy"). I aun
reminded here, for example, of contemporary scholars whose support for private-school
choice programs reflects, at least in part, a hope that tuition vouchers will serve as a veld-
cle for additional regulation in the service of "liberal public values." See, e.g., Stephen Ma-
cedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Non-Profit Orgauizations, aud Libe,'a
Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 417, 430-42, 450-51 (2000).
144 Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentadanism, 75 Cnt.-KENT L. REv. 453,
455 (2000).
145 Id. at 475 ("The great solution to the republican problem was to promote public
virtue indirectly, by protecting freedom of speech, association, and religion, and lcaving
tie nation's communities of belief free to inculcate their ideas of the good life, each in
their own way."). Thus, odd as it might sound, the tax-exemption schenme might have
things backward. As my colleague Anthony Bellia remarked, maybe a government that sees
its purpose as the promotion of the common good in a free society should not only ex-
empt its non-commercial, mediating institutions from the burdens of taxation, it should
want these same associations to participate in and contribute to the political process.
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require.146 The alternative is, literally, monoton)y147 Recall here the
president-elect's retort to Archbishop Romero, when reminded that
"there are political implications to the Gospel": "We will take care of
those," he said. 148 And surely they will. But the task of identiiing
those political implications, and of monitoring whatever distinctions
there might be between these mere implications and the Gospel itself,
is a thwological task. It is not something the state can be trusted to "take
care of," though we should expect it to embrace eagerly the opportu-
nity to harmonize, if not monotonize, these implications. I suspect,
though, that "the Gospel" implies, and authentic religious conscious-
ness should produce, some dissonance.
This brings us back to Professor Lee's observation that the condi-
tional tax exemption is, at bottom, the government's way of paying
churches not to talk about certain things.149 But perhaps the most im-
portant way that intermediate associations do what it is that civil-
society revivalists want them to do is precisely to "talk about certain
things." Again, these associations mediate; they serve as vehicles for
concerted activity by individuals, and for amplified expression to gov-
ernment and to the world. They also, like government, express and
transmit messages of their own. We are shaped by mediating associa-
tions, even as we shape our world through them.150 These associations
are at their best, it seems to me, precisely when the), "talk about cer-
tain things" that government is not talking about, or is talking against.
After privatization and retreat, their absence is felt most keenly in the
monotonous, homogenizing sameness of the government's own ef-
forts to create the citizens it needs.
CONCLUSION
At this point, it would be fair to ask what solutions I propose for
the problems I posit. It strikes me as sound policy for government not
to impose tax burdens on associations and organizations whose pur-
146 For an engaging discussion of tie "loyalty" demanded by mediating associations-
religious communities, in particular, see generally S'EPjiEN L CARTER. ThlE DissENT OF
THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAw, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998).
147 That said, I agree with George Weigel that it would be a mistake to reduce the
Church to a mediating institution with a message, or a "voluntary asociation with a cause."
George Weigel, Papaty and Power, FiRST THINGS, Feb. 2001 at 18, 25 (stating that the
Church "is the institutional embodiment of truth claims").
148 RomERO, supra note 24.
149 Lee, supra note 6, at 434 ("Section 501(c) (3) ... pays churches through tax-exempt
status to be silent on issues deemed by the state to be political.").1
-5 See Garnett, supra note 12, at 1849-56.
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pose is not to generate income and that contribute to the polity in
ways other than wealth-generation. Notwithstanding the concerns I
have expressed, I do not mean to suggest that government restrictions
on tax-exempt organizations' election-related activities are always un-
reasonable or unjustifiable.151 Likewise, I recognize that it would be
difficult to remove such restrictions for religious associations, while
retraining them for other tax-exempt organizations. 152
In the end, I have no solution to propose other than caution. My
hope for this admittedly diffuse Article is merely that it will prompt
further reflection about the interpretation and categorization by gov-
ernment of what religious associations say and do. A more particular
goal, perhaps, has been to highlight the dangers posed to authenti-
cally religious consciousness, to religious associations, to civil society-
and, indeed, to persons-by government efforts to define for relig-
ious believers what is religious and what is political activity.153 As I sug-
gested at the outset, maybe ChiefJustice Marshall had a point; maybe
his observation about the destructive character of the power to tax
was more than a mere "seductive cliche." Our government exercises
its power to tax precisely by conditionally exempting churches from
taxation. It labels their expression and activity according to its own
terms and, in so doing, "destroy[s]" authentically religious conscious-
ness and undermines the mediating structures of civil society.
There is a scene in the Book of Kings where Elijah the Prophet
confronts King Ahab, who, we are told, "did more to provoke the
LORD, the God of Israel, to anger than all the kings of Israel who
151 See generally, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10 (discussing government's interest in pre-
venting circumvention of campaign-finance laws and in not requiring taxpayers to "subsi-
dize" political expression to which they object). Cf Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benifits"for
Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?" 42 B.C. L. RE%,.
805, 841 (2001) ("In the final analysis, tax exemption does not subsidize churches, but
leaves them alone.").
152 The question whether die Constitution would permit-or, perhaps, whether it re-
quires-such unequal treatment of religious and non-religious nonprofits, again, goes
beyond die scope of this Article. See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 8, at 35-39 (Arguing that the
restrictions on churches' putatively political activities are unconstitutional conditions);
Goodwin, supra note 8, at 384 (arguing that "exemption of churches from taxation is not
merely constitutionally-permissible, it is constitutionally-reqtired").
153 See Bradley, supra note 17, at 330 (noting die "dehumanization implicit in the sepa-
ration of individual existence into political, economic, religious. and cultural perform-
ances, each severally and tightly controlled by internally generated norms").
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were before him."1M Ahab meets Elijah-wearily, I imagine-with this
greeting, "Is that you, 0 Disturber of the Peace?" 155 I cannot help
thinking that this is how religious believers, associations, and expres-
sion should be greeted-at least sometimes-by the government. If
they are not, maybe something is wrong. It strikes me that a radically
privatized and insufficiently irritating faith is not all that it is called to
be.156
In a similar vein, Charles Peguy, in his The Mysteiy of the Chayity of
Joan of Arc, observes that Christ "had been a good woruma," "a good
carpenter," "a good son," "a quiet young man," and "a good citizen...
easy to govern . . . until the day he had begun his mission."157 And
then, Peguy continues, he "introduced disorder" and "disturbed the
world."158 Religious faith should "disturb[] the world" and religious
communities should expect to be bothered by government. In Profes-
sor Shaffer's words, faith is "nothing until it can be allowed to mess up
American democratic, constitutional, legal, professional commit-
ment."159 Whatever tranquility government promises from privatiza-
tion is, in the end, not worth the cost to discipleship.
154 1 !Mngs 18:17.
156 SeeShaffer, supra note 30, at 1875 (noting that privatized religion ill not likely at-
tract or deserve words such as deviant or subversive, because it will so often be talked out of
confronting power").
157 CHARLES PEGUY, MYSTERY OF THE CHARITY OFJOAN oF ARc 114 (Panutheon 1950).
08 Id at 115.
159 Thomas L. Shaffer, Malybe a Law yer Can Be a Senant. If Not ... 27 TEX. TEcl. L
REv. 1345, 1348 (1996).
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